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NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE INTERNATIONAL MONOPOLIES: 
PRICES VERSUS QUANTITIES 
 







In this paper we model the case of an international non-renewable resource 
monopolist as a differential game between the monopolist and the governments of 
the importing countries, and we investigate whether a tariff on the resource 
importations can be advantageous for the importing countries. We find that the 
results depend crucially on the kind of strategies the importing country governments 
can play and on whether the monopolist chooses the price or the extraction rate. For 
a price-setting monopolist it is shown that the importing countries cannot use a tariff 
to capture monopoly rents if they are constrained to use open-loop strategies, even if 
the governments sign a tariff agreement. This result is drastically modified if the 
importing countries in the tariff agreement use Markov (feedback) strategies. For a 
quantity-setting monopolist the nature of the game changes and an open-loop tariff 
is advantageous for the importing countries. Moreover, in this case the importing 
countries in a tariff agreement enjoy a strategic advantage which allows them to 
behave as a leader. 
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 1 Introduction
The issue of using an import tariﬀ to capture non-renewable resource rents
was addressed sometime ago in a nice piece of work by Bergstrom (1982).
In his paper, he shows that if all importing countries of a competitively
supplied non-renewable resource select the same ad valorem tariﬀ on the re-
source consumed at any time, the tariﬀ is advantageous for the importing
countries in the sense that they capture resource rents from the exporting
countries. He characterizes the Nash equilibrium of the game among the
importing countries by a simple rule relating the equilibrium ad valorem
tariﬀ to demand elasticities and market shares. In the second part of the
paper, he argues that almost all the proﬁts of a monopolist can be taxed
away by the importing countries if they choose a suﬃciently high tariﬀ as
long as the proﬁt-maximizing level of the monopolist’s price is independent
of the tariﬀ. These results are obtained for a Hotelling-type model with a
costlessly extracted non-renewable resource. Later, several papers addressed
this issue, see Brander and Djajic (1983), Karp (1984), Maskin and Newbery
(1990), Karp and Newbery (1991, 1992).1 Among them only Brander and
Djajic (1983) and Karp (1984) have addressed this issue for the case of a
non-renewable resource monopoly. Brander and Djajic develop their analy-
sis in the context of a simple two-country general equilibrium model of trade
in exhaustible resources where it is assumed that the resource is extracted
costlessly and used as an essential input in the production of a homogeneous
consumption good. They ﬁnd that the country without resource has an in-
c e n t i v et oi m p o s eat a r i ﬀ so as to extract at least some of the available rent.
T h em a g n i t u d eo ft h eo p t i m a lt a r i ﬀ i sf o u n dt ob ea ni n c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o n
of the relative size of the importing country and approaches the conﬁscatory
level as the resource importing country becomes very large. In Karp the inter-
action between a monopolist and a single buyer is modeled as a Stackelberg
game where the extraction cost is inversely related to the stock (depletion ef-
fects) and the buyer is the leader of the game. The buyer chooses a tariﬀ and
the monopolist the rate of extraction. He shows that the open-loop tariﬀ is
temporally inconsistent because of the stock-dependence of extraction costs.
Besides, he proposes a method of obtaining temporally consistent strategies
and concludes that the consistent tariﬀ against the monopolist is in general
1A recent contribution by Hörner and Kamien (2004) shows that the intertemporal
no-arbitrage condition that arises if the durable good monopolist seller can commit to a
price path mirrors the intertemporal no-arbitrage condition if the monopsonist buyer of
an exhaustible resource supplied by competitive sellers can commit to a proﬁle of import
tariﬀs. The time-consistency of the tariﬀ in this case has been studied by Kemp and Long
(1980) and Karp (1984, 1991).
3not identically zero which implies that the consistent tariﬀ allows the buyer
to improve his position.2
In the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep a p e rw em o d e lt h ec a s eo fap r i c e - s e t t i n gm o n o p -
olist selling to noncooperative consuming nations, ﬁrst studied by Bergstrom
(1982), as a diﬀerential game. In the second part, we analyze the case of
a quantity-setting monopolist. Moreover, we also extend his analysis by as-
suming that extraction cost is directly related to accumulated extractions
(depletion eﬀects).
Contrary to the results obtained by Bergstrom (1982), we ﬁnd that the
proﬁt-maximizing level of the monopolist’s price is not independent of the
tariﬀ a n dt h a tt h eo p e n - l o o pN a s he q u i l i b r i u mt a r i ﬀ is zero. This result
appears because the user cost for the importing countries is equal to the tariﬀ
times the monopoly price and because the extraction cost is supported by the
monopolist. In this case the user cost for importing countries must increase
at a rate equal to the interest rate but this is incompatible with the fact
that ultimately the rent must be zero because of the economic exhaustion
of the resource. We also ﬁnd that this result applies for a per unit tariﬀ
and when the importing countries cooperate imposing the same tariﬀ rate
on the resource importations, i.e., when the importing country governments
sign a tariﬀ agreement, and independently of whether it is assumed that the
countries are symmetric or not.
In order to clarify whether this result is a consequence of the equilibrium
concept used to solve the game, we propose a diﬀerential game between a
monopolist and a coalition of importing country governments for which it is
possible to calculate the stationary linear Markov strategies. The solution
to this game establishes that the importing countries can capture part of the
monopoly’s rents for their consumer using a tariﬀ on the resource importa-
tions. Thus, we ﬁnd that when the monopolist chooses a pricing policy the
tariﬀ is advantageous for the importing countries if the importing countries
co-operate through a tariﬀ agreement and the optimal policy is deﬁned using
a feedback strategy.
For the case of a quantity-setting monopolist, as the importing countries
have no inﬂuence on the dynamics of the stock, the game among the im-
porting countries becomes, in fact, a static game and given the inﬂuence of
the tariﬀ rate on the monopoly price the importing countries ﬁnd it advan-
2He proposes an alternative method to the one developed by Simaan and Cruz (1973),
see Prop.2 in Karp’s paper. Simaan and Cruz’s method is for the leader to treat the
follower’s dynamic programming equation as a constraint, and to solve his own problem
using dynamic programing methods. This “backward” method of solution eliminates at
each point all control rules that are not optimal given the state at the time, and results
in consistent control rules.
4tageous to set a tariﬀ on the resource importations.3 On the other hand,
if the governments of the importing countries sign a tariﬀ agreement it is
pretty obvious that the open-loop Nash equilibrium policy is to choose, for
a given extraction rate, a tariﬀ such that the monopolist’s price be zero, but
then the monopoly is not interested in exploiting the resource so that ﬁnally
the consumers of the importing countries are not going to enjoy any surplus.
However, the coalition has another alternative since the importing country
governments, in fact, enjoy a strategic advantage given that they can inﬂu-
ence the monopoly price through the tariﬀ. In other words, the importing
country governments have another alternative because the coalition can be-
have as a leader.4 To conclude the analysis we calculate, following the Simaan
and Cruz’s (1973) method, the stationary Markov-perfect Stackelberg equi-
librium in linear strategies which guarantees the strong time consistency of
the tariﬀ, and we obtain that the importing countries are interested in set-
ting a tariﬀ that provides the monopoly with the possibility of obtaining a
positive price with the aim of getting a positive surplus for their consumers.
A policy that clearly is superior to the one derived from the open-loop Nash
equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the case of a price-setting
monopolist is studied and the case of a quantity-setting monopolist is dealt
with in Section 3. The comparison between the Markov-perfect Nash equi-
librium of the diﬀerential game where the monopolist sets up the price and
the Markov-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium where the monopolist sets up
the extraction rate appears in Section 4. Conclusions and subjects for future
research are presented in Section 5.
2 The Case of a Price-setting Monopolist
As in Bergstrom’s (1982) analysis, we shall conﬁne ourselves to a partial equi-
librium model. Assuming that the representative consumer of the importing
country acts as a price-taker agent, we can write the consumer’s welfare func-
tion as Ui(qi)−p(1+θi)qi+Ri, where Ui(qi) is the consumer’s gross surplus,
qi the amount of the resource bought by the representative consumer of the
importing country i, p the international price of the resource, θi the “ad
valorem” tariﬀ rate on the resource imports ﬁxed by the government of the
importing country i,a n dRi a lump-sum transfer that the consumer receives
3This is the same result as the one obtained by Karp and Newbery (1991) when com-
petitive suppliers move ﬁrst in the game. However, we get it here as a consequence of the
fact that the monopolist uses the extraction rate as a control variable.
4This is the hypothesis explored by Karp (1984).
5from the government. Thus, the resource demand depends only on the con-
sumer price: U 
i(qi)=p(1 + θi) and the demand function can be written as
qi = Di(p(1 + θi)) with D 
i < 0 if the marginal utility is decreasing.5 Thus
the aggregate demand is Q =
Sn
i=1 Di(p(1 + θi)).
The governments set the tariﬀ with the aim of maximizing the discounted
present value of the representative consumer’s welfare. They reimburse tariﬀ
revenues as lump-sum transfers,s ot h a tﬁnally the consumer’s welfare does
not depend on tariﬀ revenues. The optimal time path for the tariﬀ is thus






−rt(Ui(Di(p(1 + θi))) − pDi(p(1 + θi)))dt, i =1 ,...,n. (1)
where r is the discount rate.
On the other side of the market we have a monopoly extracting the re-
source at an aggregate cost equal to c(x)Q, where c(x) is the marginal extrac-
tion cost, with c  > 0 and c   ≥ 0,xstands for the accumulated extractions
and Q for the current extraction rate of the resource. The objective of the















Given the price the extraction rate is determined by the demand function so
that the dynamics of the accumulated extractions is
˙ x = Q =
n [
i=1
Di(p(1 + θi)),x (0) = x0 ≥ 0. (3)
Both types of players face the same dynamic constraint and the optimal
time paths for the tariﬀ and the price are given by the solution of the diﬀer-
ential game between the monopolist and the n importing countries deﬁned
by (1) − (2) − (3).
2 . 1 T h eO p e n - l o o pN a s hE q u i l i b r i u m
First, we write the Hamiltonian associated to the optimal control problems
of the importing countries.
5D 
i stands for the derivative of the demanded quantity with respect to the consumer
price: p(1 + θi).




which yields the following necessary conditions
pθi = −λi, ˙ λi = rλi, (4)
which establish that for a given value of the co-state variable the price is a
strategic substitute of the tariﬀ rate. Notice that now, as the extraction costs
are supported directly by the monopolist, the tariﬀ, pθi, must increase at the
interest rate.
For the monopolist the Hamiltonian is




and the necessary conditions are
n [
i=1





i =0 , (5)





where (5) is the instantaneous reaction function of the monopoly. By diﬀer-





i +( p − c + λM)(D 




i=1(1 + θi)D 
i +( p − c + λM)
Sn
i=1(1 + θi)2D  
i
< 0, (7)
and so we can establish that if the demand functions are concave, the tariﬀ
rate of one importing country is also a strategic substitute of the monopoly
price for given values of the state and co-state variables.
With D  
i ≤ 0, the numerator and the denominator of (7) are negative
since by (5) (p−c+λM) must be positive. Moreover, it is easy to check that
(5) is the standard condition that characterizes the monopoly equilibrium:
7marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, now including the user cost of the
resource. (5) can be written as
Sn
i=1 Di Sn
i=1(1 + θi)D 
i
+ p = c − λM,







= c − λM = MC,
where εQ,p is the elasticity of the aggregate demand function.
The open-loop Nash equilibrium is given by the solution to the following
system of 2n +3equations.
pθi = −λi,i =1 ,...,n, (8)



















In order to calculate the steady state we have to take into account that
the diﬀerent countries can have diﬀerent backstop prices. In this case, what is
going to occur is that the countries are going to leave the market sequentially
as the monopoly price reaches its backstop price so that the steady state






M =0 ,i=1 ,...,n, p ∞ = c(x∞) and
Dj(p∞)=0where j is the country with the highest backstop price. Then it
is straightforward that
Proposition 1 The governments of the importing countries cannot capture
t h er e s o u r c er e n tu s i n gat a r i ﬀ, in other words, the open-loop Nash equilibrium
tariﬀ rate with depletion eﬀects is zero.
This is an immediate consequence of the fact that the tariﬀ, pθi, must
increase at a constant rate which is incompatible with the fact that ulti-
mately the tariﬀ rate must be zero because of the economic exhaustion of
the resource. Notice that the price cannot be zero since at the steady state
it is equal to the marginal extraction cost. Thus the unique path that can
8converge to the steady state requires that θi = λi =0throughout the ex-
ploitation period of the resource and then the system (8)-(9)-(10)-(11)-(12)
yields the standard solution for the monopolistic extraction with depletion
eﬀects. As long as this argument does not depend on the cost structure, the
result will also be valid when there are no depletion eﬀects. It will be valid as
well even if the importing countries cooperate imposing the same tariﬀ rate
on the resource importations, i.e., even if the importing country governments
sign a tariﬀ agreement and independently of whether we assume that they
are symmetric or not. It is easy to show that the previous result also applies
to the case of a per unit tariﬀ s i n c ea l lt h ea n a l y s i sf o rt h ep e ru n i tt a r i ﬀ is
identical to the one developed in this section simply substituting pθi by the
per unit tariﬀ.
2.2 A Tariﬀ Agreement: The Markov-perfect Nash
Equilibrium
Next, we want to investigate whether this last result is a consequence of the
equilibrium concept used to solve the game. To do so we propose in this
section a game for which it is possible to calculate the stationary Markovian
(feedback) strategies. Now we assume that the governments of the importing
countries sign an agreement to impose the same per unit tariﬀ on the resource
importations with the aim of maximizing the discounted present value of the
sum of the aggregate consumer’s welfare.6 In order to obtain an analytical
solution for the game we also assume that the consumer’s gross surplus is
given by Ui(qi)=aqi −(1/2)q2
i and that the extraction cost is linear, c(x)=
cx. With these changes we have a diﬀerential game between a monopolist
and a coalition of the importing country governments that can be written as






−rt((p − cx)n(a − p − θ))dt, (13)








(a − p)(a − p − θ) −
1
2




6As we have obtained the same qualitative results both for an ad valorem tariﬀ and
f o rap e ru n i tt a r i ﬀ, the change in the speciﬁcation of the tariﬀ does not suppose a strong
discontinuity in the analysis developed in this paper. Besides, a per unit tariﬀ allows us
to compute the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium in linear strategies.
9the dynamic constraint being
s.t. ˙ x = Q = n(a − p − θ),x (0) = x0 ≥ 0. (15)
Markov strategies must satisfy the following system of Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equations:





(a − p)(a − p − θ) −
1
2





An(a − p − θ)}, (16)
rWM =m a x
{p}
{(p − cx)n(a − p − θ)+W
 
Mn(a − p − θ)}, (17)
where WM(x) stands for the optimal current value functions associated with
the dynamic optimization problem for the monopoly (13) and WA(x) for the
optimal current value functions associated with the dynamic optimization
problem for the agreement (14); i.e., they denote the maxima of the objectives
(13) and (14) subject to (15) for the current value of the state variable.
From the ﬁrst-order conditions for the maximization of the right-hand
sides of the HJB equations, we get the instantaneous reaction functions of







(a + cx − W
 
M − θ). (19)
These expressions establish that the optimal tariﬀ is independent of the
monopoly price and equal, as before, to the user cost of the resource for the
importing countries, and that the price and the tariﬀ are strategic substitutes
for the monopolist.
By substitution of (18) and (19), we get the solution of the price as a func-
tion of the ﬁrst derivatives of the value functions: p = 1
2 (a + cx − W 
M + W 
A).
Next, by incorporating the optimal strategies into the HJB Eqs. (16) and
(17), we eliminate the maximization and obtain, after some calculations, a



















In order to derive the solution to this system of diﬀerential equations, we









2 + βMx + µM, (22)
and we apply the same procedure as the one used by Wirl and Dockner (1995)
to calculate the coeﬃcients, see Appendix A. Substituting these coeﬃcients in
(18) and (19), we obtain the linear Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium strate-

























By visual inspection it can be seen that the tariﬀ is inversely related to
the accumulated extractions whereas the price increases with the exploitation
of the resource. Now using the equilibrium strategies, diﬀerential equation
(15) can be solved, yielding








































Finally, the consumer price can be simply calculated by the addition of
the monopoly price and tariﬀ.













so we can summarize these results as
7In order to simplify the presentation we assume that x0 =0 . This does not change
the sign of the dynamics of these two variables.
11Remark 1 The Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium tariﬀ rate decreases through-
out the exploitation period of the resource and converges to zero in the long
run. Moreover, the monopoly and consumer prices are increasing and con-
v e r g et ot h eb a c k s t o pp r i c e .
Clearly, these results establish that the commitment that the open-loop
Nash equilibrium requires for the importing countries, a commitment for the
entire exploitation period of the resource, drastically reduces the possibilities
of using a tariﬀ to capture part of the monopoly’s rents. In other words,
the importing country governments have to play feedback strategies, i.e., to
deﬁne the optimal policy as a function of the accumulated extractions, in
order to be able to impose an advantageous tariﬀ for the consumers.












(4r +3 nδ)2,W M(x)=2 WA(x). (28)
3 The Case of a Quantity-setting Monopolist
Until now we have assumed that the monopoly chooses the price and the
market establishes the resource extraction rate. In this section we analyze
the other possibility the monopoly has: to choose the quantity and leave the
market to set up the price. In this case by substitution of the inverse demand












p(Q,¯ θ)(1 + θi)

, (29)
where ¯ θ is the vector of the tariﬀ rates.
A st h ee x t r a c t i o nr a t ei sd e t e r m i n e db yt h em o n o p o l i s t ,t h eg o v e r n m e n t s
of the importing countries have no inﬂuence on the dynamics of the stock.
For this reason, in this case the tariﬀ rate is given by the Nash equilibrium
o ft h es t a t i cg a m ed e ﬁned by (29). In other words, at each point in time the
i m p o r t i n gc o u n t r i e sc h o o s eat a r i ﬀ rate to maximize the instantaneous ﬂow
of the consumer’s welfare given the extraction rate and the rival’s tariﬀ rates.















12and as U 






















that by substitution into the above expression yields
pθi = −
Di S
j =i D 
j(1 + θj)
,i =1 ,...,n. (30)
This is the version for an “ad valorem” tariﬀ of the one obtained by Karp
and Newbery (1991, p. 288) for a per unit tariﬀ.
Assuming that the system (30) has a unique solution, the dynamic of the
extraction rate and hence the dynamics of the tariﬀ rate can be calculated as
the solution of a standard optimal control problem.8 This result shows that
the nature of the game changes when the monopoly sets the quantity instead
of the price. Now at each moment, given the extraction rate, the importing
countries can use the tariﬀs to reduce the monopoly price and in this way,
increase domestic welfare.
3.1 A Tariﬀ Agreement: The Markov-Perfect Stackel-
berg Equilibrium
In order to complete the analysis of the previous section we look now at the
game between the monopolist and the coalition of the importing countries.
When the monopolist chooses the extraction rate, the monopoly price de-
pends on the tariﬀ selected by the countries in the tariﬀ agreement according
to the demand inverse function
p = a − θ − (Q/n), (31)
so that the instantaneous aggregate welfare of the importing country con-























8For a linear demand the existence of a solution could be shown at least for the sym-
metric case although not the uniqueness. For a per unit tariﬀ both the existence and the
uniqueness can be shown.
13From this expression it is pretty obvious that the optimal policy is to choose,
for a given quantity, a tariﬀ such that the price be zero: θ = a − (Q/n).
However, in this case, the monopoly has no interest in exploiting the re-
source so that ﬁn a l l yi nt h eo p e n - l o o pN a s he q u i l i b r i u mo ft h eg a m e ,t h e
importing countries are not going to obtain any surplus. Given this result
and the structure of the game, we think that a Stackelberg equilibrium bet-
ter represents the relationship between the countries in the tariﬀ agreement
and the monopolist. What happens is that the inﬂuence of the tariﬀ rate on
the monopoly price gives a strategic advantage to the countries in the tariﬀ
a g r e e m e n ts ot h a tt h e yc a nb e h a v ea saleader.9 Next, we show that the
importing countries are interested in establishing a tariﬀ that gives the mo-
nopolist the possibility of obtaining a positive price with the aim of obtaining
a positive surplus for their consumers. A policy that is clearly superior to
the one established above.
Since it is well known that an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium besides
not being subgame perfect (strong time inconsistency) can also be temporally
inconsistent (weak time inconsistency),we propose in this section to calculate
a Markov-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium which will satisfy the weak time
consistency as well. The method of obtaining a Markov-perfect Stackelberg
equilibrium we use in this paper was ﬁrst proposed by Simaan and Cruz
(1973). The method is for the leader to treat the follower’s HJB equation as
a constraint, and to solve his own problem using dynamic programming.
In order to calculate this kind of equilibrium we need the instantaneous
reaction function of the follower, i.e., of the monopolist, which is obtained
from the following HJB equation where the price is given by (31)
rWM =m a x
{Q}
{(a − θ − (Q/n) − cx)Q + W
 
MQ}.





(a − θ − cx + W
 
M), (32)
the monopoly’s instantaneous reaction function.
Then the HJB equation for the coalition of the importing country gov-
9Lewis, Lindsey and Ware (1986) have analyzed the interaction between a resource
monopolist and a coalition of consumers that act collectively to introduce a durable long-
lived substitute. They compare the equilibrium predictions of a non-commitment model
with two other models where the monopolist and the resource consumer act as time-
committed Stackelberg leaders.
14ernments can be written as





(a − cx + W
 
M)















where (31) and (32) have been used to calculate the monopoly price and re-
source importations q = Q/n. The ﬁrst-order condition for the maximization
of the right-hand side of this equation yields the optimal policy or strategy


















By substitution of the optimal tariﬀ into the HJB equation of the import-
ing country governments and of the tariﬀ and extraction rates into the HJB
equation of the monopoly, we eliminate the maximization and obtain, after



















Now, proceeding in the same way as in the previous section, we get the


























By visual inspection it can be seen that the tariﬀ a n de x t r a c t i o nr a t e sa r e
inversely related to the accumulated extractions.
Since ˙ x = Q, we can use (39) to calculate the dynamics of the accumulated



















































and adding this price to the tariﬀ rate, the consumer price is













so we can summarize these results as
Remark 2 The Markov-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium tariﬀ and extraction
rates decrease throughout the exploitation period of the resource and converge
to zero in the long run. Moreover, the monopoly and consumer prices are
increasing and converge to the backstop price.
This result along with the previous one establish that it is advantageous
for the importing countries to coordinate and impose a common tariﬀ on
the resource importations, both if the monopoly chooses the price and if the
monopoly chooses the extraction rate. However, in this second case, the
importing countries enjoy a strategic advantage and can impose a higher
tariﬀ rate as we show in the next section.





















(9r +5 nγ)2. (46)
4 Comparing the Two Equilibria
This section compares the Nash equilibrium (MPNE) and the Stackelberg
equilibrium in which importing countries act as a leader (MPSE). First, we
compare the initial values of the optimal strategies.
16Lemma 1 The initial consumer price and tariﬀ rate are lower and the initial
monopoly price is higher in the MPNE than in the MPSE.
Proof. See Appendix B.
This result establishes that the strategic advantage of the importing coun-
try governments translates into a higher initial value for the tariﬀ,w h i c hr e -
duces the demand for the resource. The reduction in initial demand explains
why the initial monopoly price is lower in the MPSE. Thus, a higher tariﬀ
has two eﬀects on the consumer price: one direct and positive and another
indirect and negative through the monopoly price. The net eﬀect is posi-
tive because the reduction in demand does not completely translate into the
monopoly price, given that the demand function is linear and the marginal
extraction cost is constant. Hence, the initial consumer price is lower in the
MPNE although the monopoly price is higher.
We now turn to the transitional dynamics.
Proposition 2 The tariﬀ in the MPSE is above the MPNE tariﬀ.C o n t r a r -
i l y ,t h em o n o p o l yp r i c ei nt h eM P S Ei sb e l o wt h eM P N Em o n o p o l yp r i c e .
However, the consumer price in the MPSE is ﬁrst above, but later below, the
MPNE consumer price.
Proof. See Appendix C.
This result is a logical consequence of the fact that both equilibria con-
verge to the same long run equilibrium characterized by the economic ex-
haustion of the resource. Accordingly, the total amount mined is the same —
irrespective of the equilibrium concept used to solve the game - and the area
under the temporal path of the extraction rate must therefore be the same
as well. The temporal paths must thus intersect. The monotonic behavior of
the variables explains why the paths intersect only once. The intersection of
the temporal paths of the extraction rate occurs along with the intersection
of the temporal paths of the consumer price. However, for the tariﬀ and
monopoly price there are no intersection points. This is possible because
of the inverse relationship between the tariﬀ and monopoly price for both
equilibria. In the MPSE the tariﬀ is higher than the tariﬀ in the MPNE
whereas the monopoly price is lower. Then as the consumer price is given
by the tariﬀ plus the monopoly price, the consumer price can be ﬁrst higher,
and later lower, in the MPSE than in the MPNE.
Moreover, it is easy to show that although the leadership position is ad-
vantageous for the importing countries, the eﬃciency of the market decreases.
17Proposition 3 When the importing country governments have a strategic
advantage, the aggregate consumer’s wel f a r ei n c r e a s e sw h i l et h em o n o p o l y ’ s
rent and aggregate welfare (measured as the aggregate consumer’s welfare plus
monopoly’s rent) decrease, compared with the MPNE.
Proof. See Appendix D.
We show that this result holds for any value of the accumulated extrac-
tions less than its steady state level. This is a standard result that can
be found in the comparison between the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria in
diﬀerent models.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have revisited the issue, ﬁrst tackled by Bergstrom (1982),
of using a tariﬀ on a non-renewable resource importations in order to ap-
propriate part of the monopoly’s rents. We extend the analysis taking into
account that the exploitation of non-renewable resources is characterized by
the presence of depletion eﬀects, i.e., the marginal extraction cost increases
for the same extraction rate as the accumulated extractions increase.
For the case of a monopolistic market the results depend crucially on the
kind of strategies the importing country governments play and on whether
the monopolist chooses the price or the extraction rate. For a price-setting
m o n o p o l i s tw es h o wt h a tt h ei m p o r t i n gc o u n t r i e sc a n n o tu s eat a r i ﬀ to cap-
ture the monopoly rents if they are constrained to use open-loop strategies,
i.e., if they commit to a temporal path for the tariﬀ, even if the governments
sign a tariﬀ agreement to impose the same tariﬀ. This result drastically
changes if the importing countries co-operate through a tariﬀ agreement and
use Markov (feedback) strategies, i.e., if they commit to a rule that ﬁxes
the tariﬀ as a function of the accumulated extractions (the state variable of
the game). In this case a tariﬀ is clearly advantageous for the consumers
of the importing countries. For a quantity-setting monopolist the nature of
the game changes, in fact, for the importing country governments the game
becomes a static game and now the importing countries ﬁnd it advantageous
to set a tariﬀ on resource importations. Finally, we show that when the
governments of the importing countries sign a tariﬀ agreement they enjoy a
strategic advantage which allows them to act as the leader of the game.
Although we think that this paper clariﬁes and extends the analysis of
the possibilities of using a tariﬀ to capture non-renewable resource rents it
would be of interest to address this issue when there is no cooperation among
the importing country governments for the case of a price-setting monopolist.
18In particular, we have calculated the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium for a
diﬀerential game between a coalition of importing country governments and
a monopolist that sets the price but, although we guess that the qualitative
result is not going to change, it would be useful to know whether the import-
ing countries can gain by imposing a feedback tariﬀ without coordination,
i.e., without signing a tariﬀ agreement. Another issue that we would like to
address in the future is the one relating to the stability of the agreements.
A Derivation of the Stationary Linear Markov
Strategies
Substituting WA,W  
A,W M and W 
M into (20) and (21), collecting terms
with equal powers of x, and equating the coeﬃcients of these terms to zero,
one obtains the following system of coupled Riccati equations
4rαA = n(c − αA − αM)
2, (47)
2rαM = n(c − αA − αM)
2, (48)
4rβA = −n(a + βA + βM)(c − αA − αM), (49)
2rβM = −n(a + βA + βM)(c − αA − αM), (50)
8rµA = n(a + βA + βM)
2, (51)
4rµM = n(a + βA + βM)
2. (52)
These equations can be explicitly solved by the following change in the
variables: y = αA + αM and z = βA + βM. Adding the ﬁrst two equations
and the last two equations yields a system in the new variables
4ry =3 n(c − y)
2, (53)
4rz = −3n(a + z)(c − y). (54)
The solution for the ﬁrst equation is









In order to choose between the two roots a stability condition is used.
Next, we develop this stability condition. Using the proposed value functions
the linear Markov strategies can be written as
θ = −αAx − βA,p =
1
2
(a + βA − βM +( c + αA − αM)x), (56)




(a + βA + βM − (c − αA − αM)x).









(c − αA − αM)=−
n
2
(c − y) < 0,
so that the stability condition requires that c − y>0. This condition is
satisﬁed by the lowest root of (55) yielding































By substitution in (56) we obtain the linear Makov-perfect Nash equilib-
rium strategies for the tariﬀ and the price (23) and (24). Finally, using (59)
in (51) and (52) we obtain
µA =
2a2nr
(4r +3 nδ)2,µ M =
4a2nr
(4r +3 nδ)2,
and by substitution the value functions (28).
BP r o o f o f L e m m a 1
Let us suppose that θ
S(0) ≤ θ
N(0).10 Then using (26) and (42) for t =0we
obtain after obvious simpliﬁcations that 36cr+16nγ2 ≤ 27nδ
2. In Appendix
10Superscript N stands for the MPNE and S for the MPSE.
20A we have establish that 4ryN =3 n(c−yN)2 =3 nδ
2, see (53). On the other
hand, the Riccati equations for the MPSE yield 9ryS =5 n(c − yS)2 =5 nγ2
where γ = c − yS by deﬁnition. Then by substitution of nγ2 and nδ
2 in the
above inequality we obtain that 5δ +yS ≤ 0. Developing 9ryS =5 n(c−yS)2
we obtain the following quadratic equation (yS)2−(2c+(9r/5n))yS +c2 =0
which has two positive roots, the lowest root being the one that satisﬁes the
stability condition so that γ = c−yS > 0. Then as δ is positive, see (57) and




Next, we compare the initial monopoly prices. Let us suppose that
pS(0) ≥ pN(0). Then using (26) and (43) for t =0we obtain after obvi-
ous simpliﬁcations that 54rγ +24nγ2 ≤ 27rδ. Using again that 9ryS =5 nγ2
we obtain after substituting nγ2 in the previous inequality and rearranging
terms that 81c+54γ +135yN ≤ 0. Where yN i st h el o w e s tr o o to f( 5 5 ) .I ti s
very easy to show that this root is positive so that a contradiction is estab-
lished since γ is also positive. Then we have that pS(0) <p N(0). Finally, we





















































Let us suppose that this diﬀerence is negative or zero. Then we can write
reordering terms and simplifying
10(3cnr + r
2)
0.5 ≤ r +3 ( 2 0 cnr +9 r
2)
0.5.
Squaring, reordering terms and squaring again we have the contradiction:
4cn + r ≤ 0. Thus, we obtain that πS(0) > πN(0), which also implies that
δ/2 − γ/3 is positive.
21C Proof of Proposition 2
For the comparison of the tariﬀ temporal paths, we use (26) and (42). The




















For t =0we know from Lemma 1 that the diﬀerence θ
S(0)−θ
N(0) is positive.
For t  =0we can ﬁnd the number of intersection points from the equation
θ
S − θ


















However, this equation has no solution for t ≥ 0 since the l.h.s. is a positive
constant less than one and the r.h.s. is an increasing and convex function
w h i c ht a k e st h eu n i tv a l u ef o rt =0 , and tends to inﬁnity when t tends to
inﬁnity since as it has been shown in Lemma 1 δ/2−γ/3 is positive. Hence,
the temporal path of the MPSE tariﬀ is above the temporal path of the
MPNE in the interval [0,∞). T h es a m ep r o c e d u r ec a nb eu s e dt os h o wt h a t
t h et e m p o r a lp a t ho ft h eM P S Em o n o p o l yp r i c ei sb e l o wt h et e m p o r a lp a t h
of the MPNE in the interval [0,∞). For comparing the temporal paths of the
consumer price we calculate the diﬀerence between the two temporal paths











































where the l.h.s. is a positive constant higher than one and the r.h.s. is an
increasing and convex function which takes the unit value for t =0 ,a n d
tends to inﬁnity when t tends to inﬁnity as we have just seen. Hence, the
temporal paths cut each other once in the interval [0,∞), and consequently,
for 0 ≤ t<t  ,w h e r et  is the solution to Eq. (60), the MPSE consumer price
is above the MPNE consumer price, whereas for t  <tthe relationship is the
contrary.
22D Proof of Proposition 3
We begin this proof comparing the aggregate consumer’s welfare. First, we
show that the value functions reach an absolute minimum for x = a/c for
w h i c hw eh a v et h a tWS
A(a/c)=WN
A (a/c)=0 . This implies that the value
functions (28) and (45) are positive and decreasing in the interval [0,a/c).The


















According to (57) the denominator can be written as 4rc − 4ryN +3 n(c −
yN)2 where −4ryN +3 n(c − yN)2 =0according to (53) which yields xN∗ =






8rc2(4r +3 nδ)2 =0 .
This expression is zero since, as we have just shown, 4rδ +3 nδ
2 =4 rc.
This establishes that the value function is positive and decreasing in the


















According to what we have written in Appendix B the denominator can be
written as 9rc−9ryS +5n(c−yS)2 where −9ryS +5n(c−yS)2 =0 , see also





a2n((9rγ +5 nγ2)2 − 81r2c2)
6rc2(9r +5 nγ)2 =0 .
This expression is zero since 9rγ +5 nγ2 =9 rc. This establishes that the
value function for the agreement in the MPSE is positive and decreasing in
the interval [0,a/c).


























2(9r +5 nγ)2 −
2a2nr
(4r +3 nδ)2. (61)
The ﬁrst coeﬃc i e n to ft h i sl i n e a r - q u a d r a t i cf u n c t i o ni sp o s i t i v ei f4γ2 − 3δ
2


















Let us suppose that 4γ2 − 3δ


















0.5 ≤ 10(3cnr + r
2)
0.5 +5 .59r.
Squaring, reordering terms and squaring again we get the contradiction:
57600c2n2r2 + 16172cnr3 ≤ 0 which establishes that 4γ2 − 3δ
2 is positive.
Now, we look at the second coeﬃcient of the diﬀerence WS
A(x) − WN
A (x).














Let us suppose that 4γ − 3δ ≤ 0. Then it must be satisﬁed that
3(20cnr +9 r
2)
0.5 ≤ 5(3cnr + r
2)
0.5 +4 r.
Squaring, reordering terms and squaring again we get the contradiction:
11025c2n2 + 3600cnr ≤ 0 which establishes that 4γ − 3δ is positive. Finally,
we compare the independent coeﬃcients. Let us suppose that
27a2nr
2(9r +5 nγ)2 −
2a2nr
(4r +3 nδ)2 ≤ 0.
Developing this inequality we obtain
432r
2 +6 4 8 rnδ +2 4 3 n
2δ
2 ≤ 324r
2 +3 6 0 rnγ +1 0 0 n
2γ
2,




0.5 +7 r ≤ 9(20cnr +9 r
2)
0.5.
Squaring and reordering terms we get the following contradiction:
368r
2 +1 0 2 0 cnr + 280r(3cnr + r
2)
0.5 ≤ 0.
Thus, we can conclude that δ > γ which establishes that
27a2nr
2(9r +5 nγ)2 >
2a2nr
(4r +3 nδ)2
in (61). This means that all the coeﬃcients in (61) are positive and that this























































so that the unique solution for (62) is a/c. This allows us to conclude that
the diﬀerence WS
A(x)−WN
A (x) is positive and decreasing for x in the interval
[0,a/c). In other words, when the importing country governments have a
strategic advantage, the aggregate consumer’s welfare in the MPSE is greater
the aggregate consumer’s welfare in the MPNE.
The comparison between WS
M(x) and WN
M(x) and also the comparison





by step the comparison we have just ﬁnished to present for this reason we
omit them. We only mention that the value functions for the monopoly in
both equilibria have the same properties that the value functions for the
agreement. They are positive and decreasing in the interval [0,a/c).
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